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DESIGN OF ROAD VEHICLES COMPONENTS RESPECTING 
THE FUNCTIONAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES  
Michal Richtář1, Jakub Šmiraus2 
Summary: This paper deals with the functional safety of road vehicles, especially the 
utilization of appropriate methods, procedures and models, in response to the new 
situation, coupled with the introduction of new standards. The paper was focused on 
the design of appropriate procedures and the utilization of qualitative and 
quantitative reliability analysis of motor vehicles selected systems, which 
significantly affect the road safety. To verify the actual levels of selected reliability 
parameters of equipment the reliability tests program has been created. 
 
Key words: Functional safety, road vehicles, safety integrity level, mechatronic system. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Road vehicles are complex devices that combine various branches of engineering. The 
result is a device composed of several subsystems that are interconnected and work together 
synchronously. When we look on their reliability and safety, it is necessary to access these 
subsystems as the elements of a coherent system. Evaluation of subsystems then usually 
makes separately. Application of certain principles of functional safety becoming increasingly 
penetrate into engineering practice and in vehicles. Selected procedures and tools for 
functional safety assessment, based on the principles of functional safety of electrical / 
electronic safety-related systems, as described in the standards EN 61508 and ISO 26262, 
have been chosen. 
 
1. ANALYSIS OF TRAIN DRIVER VIEW 
For the system functional safety assessment are using different methodologies, which 
are usually based on basic standard EN 61508 and  DIN ISO 26262. One of the most pressing 
problems for the construction of road vehicles could be transition to determine safety and 
structural elements according to this standard, particularly in connection with the evaluation 
of the mechanical parts. This transition would probably mean taking over methodologies for 
determining the functional safety of electronic components with the necessary modifications. 
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Another complicating component of this transition is evaluation of the diagnostic coverage for 
mechanical components. 
Overall procedure of functional safety process consist of two main phases – the 
analytical phase and the verification phase. 
 Activities performed during the analytical phase should be implemented already in the 
design phase of a product, because of the need to minimize modifications to its structure and 
reduce the number of corrective action during production. Within the analytical phase the 
following steps are performed: 
 Identification of hazards associated with the operation of equipment, and determination of 
the safety integrity level ASIL for considering risk. 
 Risk analysis using appropriate methods (FTA, FMEA) 
 Suggestion of the necessary security measures, typically technical (safety function), 
maintenance, organizational and legislative or external  
 Evaluate the effectiveness of the proposed measures, repeating the risk analysis 
 Set achievement level of safety integrity ASIL designed for safety functions 
 
Activities performed during the verification phase leading to prove the reliability 
parameters of the system, such as to fulfill the requirements for the reduction of risks and to 
achieve the desired system security. This phase must include the necessary calculations to 
prove the desired target failure measures, including testing. Continuity of activities can be 
seen in graphical form in the corresponding segment in fig. 1. 
 
 
 
Source: Author 
Fig. 1 - Overall procedure of functional safety process 
 
The necessary calculations include few basic parts – diagnostic coverage (DC), 
robustness Single Point Metric (SPM), robustness Latent Fault Metric (LFM), and target 
failure measure (PFH). In the process of verification is necessary to determine the diagnostic 
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coverage.  Diagnostic coverage is split into diagnostic coverage with regard to residual faults 
(DCRF) and diagnostic coverage with regard to latent multiple point faults (DCMPFL). 
Diagnostic coverage with regard to residual faults (DCRF) indicates the efficiency of the 
diagnostic system and can be expressed as equation 1. 
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where: DCRF – diagnostic coverage with regard to residual faults [%] 
 RF  – failure rate associated to hardware element residual faults [h-1] 
   – overall failure rate [h-1] 
 
Following parameter is robustness SPM (Single Point Metric). This metrics reflects the 
robustness of the item to single point faults either by coverage from safety mechanisms or by 
design. A high single point faults metric implies that the proportion of single point faults in 
the hardware is low. The definition is given by the following equation (2). 
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where: SPF – failure rate associated to hardware element single point faults [h-1] 
 MPF – failure rate associated to hardware element multiple point faults [h-1] 
 S – failure rate associated to hardware element safe faults [h-1] 
 RF – failure rate associated to hardware element residual faults [h-1] 
 
Following parameter is robustness LFM (Latent Fault Metric). This metrics reflects the 
robustness of the item to latent faults either by coverage of faults in safety mechanisms, by 
the driver recognizing or by design. A high latent fault metric implies that the proportion of 
latent faults in the hardware is low. The definition is given by the following equation (3) and 
the target values for ASIL levels are shown in tab. 1. 
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where: SPF    – failure rate associated to hardware element single point faults [h-1] 
 MPFL  – failure rate associated to hardware element latent multiple point faults [h-1] 
 MPFDP – failure rate associated perceived or detected multiple point faults [h-1] 
 S     – failure rate associated to hardware element safe faults [h-1] 
 RF      – failure rate associated to hardware element residual faults [h-1] 
  
Tab. 1 - SPM a LFM target values for ASIL levels 
Safety integrity level ASIL B ASIL C ASIL D 
Robustness SPM > 90 % > 97 % > 99 % 
Robustness LFM > 60 % > 80 % > 90 % 
Source: ISO 26262 
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In the process of verification is necessary to determine the target failure measure (PFH). 
Target failure measure (PFH) is a basic quantitative indicator of functional safety assessment 
of hardware safety-related systems in the context of the emergence of random failures. The 
calculation procedure is dependent on the mode of operation and the hardware architecture of 
the systems. The PFH target values for ASIL levels are shown in tab. 2. 
 
Tab. 2 - PFH target values for ASIL levels 
Level ASIL PFH target values [h-1] 
D < 10-8 
C < 10-7 
B < 10-7 
A < 10-6 
    Source: ISO 26262 
 
2. APPLICATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES TO LED 
HEADLAMP 
The basic concept is given by a headlamp technical solution. The headlamp shall be 
divided into particular elements (subsystems). The headlamp is composed of a large number 
of LEDs, power supplies, control and diagnostic unit and the safety circuit with disconnector. 
  
 
Source: Author 
Fig. 2 - Block diagram of LED headlamps 
 
2.1 Verification phase for LED 
After input risk analysis a FTA models have been created. For example, FTA model in 
figure 3 represents the failure state, when main beam accidentally lights, ie hazard H8. 
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In terms of reliability are interlinked forming blocks of LED lights combined system. 
Branches H8.1 and H8.2 are arranged parallel, represent the backup system, the internal 
arrangement of the two branches is serial. 
 
 
Source: Author 
Fig. 3 - FTA for hazard H8 
 
However, a group of LED drivers (part H8.2.2) is a system with a majority backup, 
specifically 5 good from the 6. Hazard H8 represents failure state, when main beam lights 
accidentally, FTA is shown in fig. 3. The aim of the calculation is to determine a target failure 
measure, ie. failure rate of the system. Drivers form a system with majority backup, puncture 
hazard occurs when two drivers of six are damaged. The safety circuit is parallel connected 
alongside the control circuit. Calculation of drivers block is in tab. 3 and calculation of the 
FTA model is in the tab. 4. 
 
Tab. 3 - Calculation of drivers block – main beam 
Input values Calculation 
Drivers 6 Reliability Rs(t)  9,99 ·10-1 
Driver operating time 
(h) 
1000 Failure probability F(t) 
 1,92 ·10-5 
Driver failure rate (h-1) 3,33·10-6 
Failure rate  (h-1) 1,93 ·10-8  
Architecture m z n 4 ze 6 
 Source: author 
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Tab. 4 - Calculation for hazard H8 
Input values Calculation 
Block F(t) Gate F(t) 
Phototransistor 4,67·10-4 H8.1.2 3,05·10-4 
Driver 1,43·10-5 H8.1 3,79·10-4 
CPU 3,84·10-4 H8.2 4,03·10-4 
Disconnector 3,60·10-4 TOP 1,53·10-7 
Control logic  1,84·10-4 (h-1) 1,53·10-7 
  Source: author 
 
Circuit solution for hazard H8 meets target failure rate at ASIL B, as could be seen by 
comparison with the tab. 2. 
 
2.2 LED accelerated test plan 
 
The aim of this part is creation of LED accelerated test plan and verification of target 
failure measure and reliability in life cycle profile. Accelerated test is based on test plans and 
factor of acceleration using Arrhenius model has been calculated.   
According the vehicle life cycle profile is LED life span calculated for 8 years (about 
70000 hours) and lighting time 8000 hours. The test is partitioned between two parts, because 
the test must model the situation when the light is on (under voltage) and when it is off 
(without voltage). 
 
Tab. 5 Operational and test temperatures 
Mode of operation 
Test temperature  
(°C) 
Operational 
temperature  
(°C) 
Difference  
(°C) 
under vaoltage 90 50 40 
without voltage 90 20 70 
 Source: author 
For accumulated test time equation 4 has been used. Required target failure measure 
comes from the standards and determines TD. On the confidence level C = 0.7 the test has 
been evaluated (minimum value by standards) and no failure occurs during test has been 
assumed. Using equation (4) the accumulated test time is 1,2 . 106 hours. 
 
where:  TD   - lower limit of confidence interval. [h], 
tAKU - accumulated test time [h], 
2   - value of chi-square distribution [-]. 
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Factor of acceleration is for Arrhenius model described by equation 5. 
 
where:  AF    - factor of acceleration [-], 
LU    - reliability indicator at operating load [h], 
LA    - reliability indicator at increased load [h], 
TU    - load in operating conditions [K], 
TA    - increased test load [K], 
K     - Bolzman constant [eV.K-1], 
C     - model parametr, 
     - model parametr. 
 
Activation energy for all tested component is on the same level, and comes from 
manufactures data. Results of calculations are shown on tab. 6. 
 
Tab. 6 Factor of acceleration for modes of operation 
Input parameters 
Mode of 
operation 
Test temperature 
TA 
Operational 
temperature TU 
Factor of 
acceleration AF 
(K) (K) (-) 
EA (eV) 0,876 under voltage 363 323 32 
K (eV·K-1) 8,62E-05 
without 
voltage 
363 293 805 
 Source: author 
2.3 Test profile design 
The test is partitioned between two parts. In the first part LED block works under 
voltage with temperature 90 °C. The test is passed, if at least m of n diodes lighting. Test time 
is calculated using equation 6. 
 
where:  Tl     - test time [h], 
tAKU - accumulated test time [h], 
n      - number of tested components [-], 
AFS  - factor of acceleration [-], 
 
Test time for 10 LED blocks is 3450 hours and more.  
The second part is concerned to verification of reliability in life cycle profile. 
Requirement of life span is defined is defined such that after the life span 5 of 10 products 
must be in faultless state. Test simulate state, when the headlamp is on (8000 hours) and when 
is off (72000 hours). Test time is calculated using equations 7 and 8.  
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where:  T2S     - test time, under voltage [h], 
ton       - time of lighting [h], 
AFS     - factor of acceleration, under voltage [-], 
T2N     - test time, without voltage [h], 
toff        - time – light is off [h], 
AFN      - factor of acceleration, without voltage [-], 
On Off On
125 hours 90 hours 125 hours Test time [hours]
Ttest [°C]
90
75
 
Source: author 
Fig. 4 Test profile of LED 
 
Test time for second part of test is at least 340 hours, 5 LED blocks of 10 must be in 
faultless state. Test profile is shown on fig. 4. Both test parts have a different test times. It is 
evident, that the requirements to verification of reliability in life cycle profile are easier than 
requirements to verification of ASIL level. 
 
3. APPLICATION OF THE FUNCTIONAL SAFETY PRINCIPLES TO 
MOTOCYCLE MECHATRONIC SYSTEM  
Functional safety of mechatronic motorcycle system, which regulate the chassis 
parameters is also is given by a system technical solution. The basic step is decomposition to 
the electronic and mechanical system. The electronic part in this case consists of a control 
system (selector), electronic control unit and accessories (position sensor, acceleration sensor, 
etc.) and power supply parts (accumulator, generator and wiring). The mechanical part 
consists of pins and bearings, linear motion screw, gearbox and the electric drive. The 
diagnostics of system ensures safety cut-off relay which controls the actuator position and 
sensors output signal. In the case of conflict for more than a defined interval, cut-off relay 
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disconnect the system and switch warning light on MIL. The diagnostic system is not 
considered simultaneously with the calculation of functional safety. It is not provided with 
any backup, only security functions in a safe state 
 
3.1 Architecture of mechatronic system 
 
 
Source: author 
Fig. 5 - Block diagram of solved motorcycle mechatronic system VGP 
 
Fault tree analysis in fig. 6 represents a failure state, when the device works with the 
clearance, which can´t be detected by safety cut-off relay. This clearance will may cause 
vibrations, which in extreme cases can cause loss of motorcycle stability or crash. This case 
(Hazard 4) leads to safety integrity level requirement at level ASIL B. Is possible to replace 
this FTA expression by serial system (RBD) of mechanical elements. The procedure for 
determining the SIL electronic part is set in the previous solution of LED headlamp. For 
mechatronic system is exactly the same, so there will not be shown. 
For mechanical elements the failure probability of individual system components cannot 
be simply obtained. However we can use the failure rate. For mechanical components such as 
bearings, joints or motion screws the manufacturers’ data can be used. In case that it is 
necessary to determine the failure rate of unknown or untested components, basically by two 
ways the required data can be obtained. 
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Source: author 
Fig. 6 - FTA for Hazard 4 (H4) (only mechanical parts) 
3.2 Failure intensity determination of mechanical elements 
At first can be obtained by reliability tests, at second by suitable mathematical model. 
The ideal choice is a mathematical method Monte Carlo or PPDV. In engineering practice is 
often used method SBRA (Simulation-Based Reliability Assessment). The advantage of this 
method is low computation time, but is demanding on computing power of the PC. The 
method calculates the probability of achieving the expected result. However, inputs for 
calculation are entered in the form of failure probability for life interval in the form of 
histograms. The input parameters for the calculation are the random quantities (geometrical 
and material characteristics, load ...) expressed by histograms like fig. 7.  
 
 
Source: author 
Fig.7 - Example of probability calculation of clearance generation due to linear motion body 
deformation using Anthill (condition Fs = τDov – τvyp , Fs > 0 = satisfied) 
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Probability of matrix deformation is 2,69.10-6. Similarly probabilities of the other 
elements are calculated and is possible to calculate the final probability of H4. 
 
      (9) 
 
 
 
 
 
F(t)=1-R(t)                                                             (10) 
 
Using the equation 10 the final probability PH4 = 3,7212.10-6 h-1 of hazard H4 has been 
calculated. The target failure measure must for ASIL B be less than 10-7 h-1, but calculated 
value is 3,7212.10-6 h-1. The device does not met the requirements and is necessary to make 
design changes of the system. It is not necessary to proceed the diagnostic coverage 
evaluation, because of uncompliant target failure measure calculation. 
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The content of this paper is the functional safety of road vehicles, in particular the use 
of appropriate methods, procedures and models in relation to the new situation, associated 
with the implementation of new standards. The paper was focused on the design of 
appropriate procedures and utilization qualitative and quantitative reliability analysis of 
selected systems of road vehicles that significantly affect road safety. 
For functional safety assessment procedures and tools have been selected, which are 
based on the principles of functional safety of systems, as described in the standards EN 
61508 and ISO 26262.  
Diagnostic coverage is not sufficiently solved for mechanical (mechatronic) system. 
Problems of diagnostic coverage will be subject of another scientific activities of the authors 
of this paper. Complete methodology for diagnostic coverage determination can be possible to 
apply the whole methodology of determining SIL on all mechatronic systems. This results can 
fill the gap of the ASIL determination process for complicated vehicle systems. 
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